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ALD-089        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3770 
___________ 
 
RONALD G. JOHNSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PHILIP MORGAN, Warden; BUREAU OF PRISONS;  
HOWARD R. YOUNG CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-00007 ) 
District Judge:  Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 17, 2013 
Before:  SLOVITER, VANASKIE and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed:January 28, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 In 2009, Ronald Johnson filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 
and 1986, alleging that his civil rights were violated when he was held for several days at 
the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution (“HYCI”) on an erroneous violation of 
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probation (“VOP”) charge.  His complaint named as defendants the HYCI, the Delaware 
Bureau of Prisons (“DBOP”), and Warden Phil Morgan.  The District Court dismissed 
the claims against the HYCI and the DBOP, finding them immune from suit.  On March 
30, 2012, the District Court granted Warden Morgan’s motion for summary judgment.  
On May 1, 2012, Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court 
denied on September 7, 2012.
1
  On September 24, 2012, Johnson filed a notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 with respect to the District Court’s 
September 6, 2012, order.  We begin by making clear the limited scope of this appeal.  
We do not have jurisdiction over the District Court’s March 30 order granting summary 
judgment to Morgan because Johnson’s notice of appeal was untimely filed with respect 
to that order.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 456 
(3d Cir. 2012).  Johnson’s May 1 motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
59(e) did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(a) 
because the motion for reconsideration was itself untimely.  See Baker, 670 F.3d at 460.  
As to the denial of reconsideration, we will summarily affirm. 
On December 16, 2008, Johnson was arrested pursuant to an outstanding capias 
for disorderly conduct and for charges stemming from an unrelated domestic violence 
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  Shortly after filing his motion for reconsideration, Johnson filed a flurry of additional 
motions in the District Court, including a second motion for reconsideration, two motions 
to reopen case, a motion for mental evaluation, a motion to stay, a motion to strike 
response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a motion for appointment of 
counsel, and a request for a competency hearing.  The District Court’s September 6, 
2012, order denying reconsideration also addressed and denied each of these motions. 
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complaint.  He was committed to the HYCI and bail was set on each of the charges.  The 
outstanding capias was resolved at a hearing on December 17, 2008.  On December 18, 
2008, a hearing was held on the domestic violence charges; a trial date was set, and 
Johnson’s bail was increased.  Thereafter, Johnson’s offender status sheet, dated 
December 18, 2008, erroneously reflected an additional VOP charge that increased the 
amount of his bail.  Instead of posting bond for both the domestic violence charges and 
the erroneous VOP charge, Johnson decided to remain in custody and attempt to have the 
VOP charge cleared from his record.  On December 19, 2008, he submitted a complaint 
that he had never been on probation, had never been arrested for a VOP, and had never 
been arraigned on such a charge.  An administrative investigation was conducted and on 
January 1, 2009, Johnson was advised that the VOP charge had been removed.  The 
following day, he posted bond for the remaining charges and was released. 
Johnson’s subsequent complaint in the District Court sought monetary damages 
for mental suffering, anxiety, and stress resulting from the additional days he spent in the 
HYCI while he attempted to clear the VOP charge from his record.  The District Court 
determined that Warden Morgan was entitled to summary judgment because Morgan had 
no personal involvement in the placement of the VOP charge on Johnson’s record, he did 
not have a duty to personally investigate Johnson’s grievance, and there was no evidence 
that he was involved in a conspiracy to deprive Johnson of his rights based on 
discriminatory animus.  Johnson unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration on the basis 
that he was suffering from a mental breakdown, depression, and anxiety. 
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 Generally, we review an order denying a motion for reconsideration for an abuse 
of discretion, and only exercise plenary review when the denial is based on the 
interpretation and application of a legal precept.  See Koshatka v. Phila. Newspapers, 
Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985).  In this case, the District Court’s denial of 
Johnson’s motion for reconsideration was not based on the interpretation and application 
of a legal precept, but on its failure to demonstrate, as a proper reconsideration motion 
must, either (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new 
evidence; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest 
injustice.  See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).  We detect no 
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that the basis for Johnson’s motion, 
which was that he was suffering from a mental breakdown, depression, and anxiety, did 
not conform to any of those requirements.  Notably, Johnson’s motion did not suggest 
any error in the District Court’s reasoning.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s September 6, 2012, order denying Johnson’s motion for reconsideration.2 
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  We will also summarily affirm the denial of Johnson’s second motion for 
reconsideration, two motions to reopen case, motion for mental evaluation, motion to 
stay, motion to strike response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, motion for 
appointment of counsel, and request for a competency hearing, substantially for the 
reasons expressed in the District Court’s September 7, 2012, order. 
